EVALUATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN UNITED NATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA.

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Abstract
The promotion of peace and security in the world necessitates security cooperation between states and collective security remains a way to pursue it. Collective security is one of the most promising approaches for peace and a valuable device for power management on an international scale. Collective security can be understood as a security arrangement, political, regional, or global, in which each state in the system accepts that the security of one is the concern of all, and therefore commits to a collective response to threats and breaches to peace. This paper explored the changed meaning, application, challenges and failure of the concept of collective security within the United Nations (UN) to deal with security concerns within the international system. Since the UN has made clear commitments to collective security. The paper highlighted the tension between the theory and practice of collective security in UN. The theory of collective security itself was adopted in this paper while secondary sources of data were used for descriptive analysis. The paper discovered that the success of collective security depends on a number of strong powers that are willing and able to enforce the norms and rules of collective security. Likewise Collective security is a workable, yet imperfect and unreliable system for vulnerable countries. The paper concluded that what is been practice by UN is "Selective Interest" not "Collective Security". Consequently, the present structure of Security Council in United Nations and their veto power is a major threat and hindrance to collective security because members with veto power consider their national interest first before collective security. This paper therefore recommends that the Security Council should be restructured to accommodate equal members from all the continents and veto power should be abrogated.

Keywords: Collective Security, Selective Interest, United Nations, Alliance, High

Introduction

The United Nation's successful collective response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (1990) created optimism that collective security could become the international norm in the post-Cold War era (Snyder 1999). This optimism was, however, short-lived with the ineffective UN responses to compel the permanent security member with veto power to abide by UN resolutions. The United States acts as if international law and collective security against oppressor applies to other countries but not to itself. As a result, the permanent members of the UN Security Council in the West started to rely on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to address security issues in Europe, while regions with less strategic importance, including sub-Saharan Africa, were largely avoided in terms of peace operations (Coleman, 2011).

Since the establishment of the League of Nations and the United Nations, collective security has functioned as a parallel component of the changing international security landscape first with the balance-of-power system, followed by a post-Cold War unipolar system, with growing elements of a multipolar world. The system of collective security could not; prevent the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, stop United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Poland from invading Iraq in March, 2003 and thwart Russia from attacking Ukraine in February, 2022. Collective security has been largely underutilized by the UN during the Cold War and post-cold war era, mainly due to superpower rivalry in the UN Security Council. One is curious to ask “can this same handicap collective security in United Nations avert third world war?” Thus, if it does then we are heading to taciturn war. Or will it be Cold War II?

The pursuance of security involves much uncertainty for states. Most countries find it difficult to promote their national security, by acting alone (Booth, 1987). States, therefore, often work together towards improving their security. According to Booth (1987), "the absence of credible defensive alliances can leave the international system at the mercy of the aggressive". Modern states have in pursuance of security, not only relied on alliances and coalitions, but also on the rules-based system of collective security, which was a creation of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and subsequently, the United Nations (UN), in an effort to establish and maintain international peace and security. Collective security is based on the principle that if there is an attack on a state, all states have to stop the aggressor.

In Article 51 of the UN Charter, collective security is considered a legal right, together with self-defense. One of the main differences between alliances and collective security is that the former is established against a current and known threat, and the latter for future and unknown threats. One of the flaws of collective security is that one or more states may refuse to act when another member state is being attacked. This weakness contributed towards the outbreak of the Second World War, when several states invaded other countries, without any action being taken.

Conceptual Clarification

It is important to have conceptual clarity on the meaning of collective security for two reasons. Firstly, some literature on collective security uses the term alliances to describe 'collective security'. For example, Rappard (1946) defined collective security as "the protection which so-called 'sovereign states' have sought to attain in their alliances against aggression". Secondly, the meaning of concepts such as collective security and alliances are often misused and distorted, especially by politicians (Booth, 1987).

Alliance/Alliances

Alliances are a form of collective defence and involve formal agreements between states to work together in pursuance of their national security goals and focus on enhancing military power and coordinating deployments (Booth, 1987). Alliances can also be used to pursue common norms and interests, as well as to achieve a balance of power for the purpose of a

stable international system (Chenoweth, 2008). Alliances usually involve a commitment between like-minded states against a known threat, which can include an opposing regional power. A collective defence organisation can be defined as a bilateral or multilateral military alliance between states for collective action against another state or set of states (Weitsman, 2014). Such Japanese Mutual Security Treaty (bilateral alliance), and the former multilateral alliance of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation/Warsaw Pact.

An alliance requires at least one state to use military force when necessary, and in general the level of military cooperation of each country, is an indication of its commitment to the alliance (Snyder, 1999). While alliances encompass long-term agreements, coalitions are of *ad hoc* and temporary nature to undertake a specific campaign or operation (Weitsman, 2014). Coalitions-of-the-willing may offer advantages in terms of composition and legitimacy, but often present practical problems in terms of command and control, and coordinating operations, due to lack of interoperability.

Collective Security

Collective security on the other hand, is a legally binding agreement between states (that are not necessarily like-minded) to not use force to resolve current or future disputes, and to act collectively against those states that break this rule (Snyder, 1999). It requires states to surrender some of their sovereignty to a supra-national body, which in this context would involve certain restrictions on autonomous military action (Chenoweth, 2008).

Collective security, therefore, involves a rules-based system, in which collective and overwhelming action is taken against aggressor-states. According to Papp (1997), collective security relies on "the major actors within the system accepting its legitimacy and responding together to punish those who did not". There are various perspectives on what collective security entails, which will receive attention. According to Danchin (2009), the concept of collective security is “notoriously difficult to define, as the term is associated with a loose set of assumptions and ideas and its continued existence remains a contested concept”. Claude Jr.(1971), agrees and further suggests that when the term collective security if used loosely, appears to be a synonym of peace or world order while it has also been used to refer to any and all multilateral efforts to deal with the problem of international peace and security, rather than a specifically to the system that gained prominence after the First World War.

Roberts and Kingsbury (1993) define collective security as “an arrangement where each state in the system accepts that security of one of them is a concern of all, and agrees to join in a collective response to aggression”. It is the foundational principle of the League of Nations: namely that member states would take a threat or attack on one member as an assault on all of them. Likewise The term "collective security" has also been cited as a principle of the United Nations and earlier the League of Nations. By employing a system of collective security, the United Nations hopes to dissuade any member state from acting in a manner likely to threaten peace and thus avoid a conflict. Kupchan (1995) sees collective security as, “an agreement between states to abide by certain norms and rules to maintain stability and when necessary, band together to stop aggression”. This definition captures three distinct ideas: the purpose or end of stopping “aggression”; the reliance on legal norms to determine both the meaning of that term and the appropriate response; and the rejection of self-help in favour of collective action.

Thus, collective security rests on the idea of institutionalizing the legal use of force, to reduce reliance of self-help as a rather crude instrument of law enforcement. When these ideas are brought together, the concept of collective security may be further defined as: “... an institutionalized universal or regional system in which States have agreed by treaty jointly to

meet any act of aggression or other illegal use of force resorted by a member State of the system." (Yade, 2000). The concept is primarily directed against the illegal use of force within the group of states forming the collective security system rather than an external threat. This idea is captured in Johnson and Niemeyer's definition of collective security as: A system based on the universal obligation of all nations to join forces against an aggressor state as soon as the fact of aggression is determined by established procedure. In such a system, aggression is defined as a wrong in universal terms and an aggressor, as soon as he is identified, stands condemned. Hence, the obligation of all nations to take action against him is conceived as a duty to support right against wrong. It is equally founded upon the practical expectation that a communal solidarity of all nations would from the outset make it clear to every government that aggression does not pay (Johnson and Niemeyers, 1954).

Methodology

Methodology explains the process between the objective and the finding in any study. It explains to the researcher and the readers, how data collection is carried out; the method used in arriving at a scientific conclusion. This study is qualitative research in its design. Data for the study are gotten from secondary source of data, these include; United Nations Report, Journals, Text Books, Internet and other publications. Secondary data analysis method will be used to analysis the proposed reforms of the United Nations system under Kofi Annan.

Collective Security and Balance of Power

Collective security selectively incorporates the concept of both balance of power and global government. However, collective security is not the same as the balance of power, which is important in realism. According to Adreatta, the balance of power focuses on a state's unilateral interests in stopping aggression. Since states look at the world as having a security dilemma because of the fear of relative gain, a state does not want any state to become predominant and so causes a mutually-restraining equilibrium. In other words, the balance of power between states supports the decentralization of power. States are separate actors and do not subordinate their autonomy or sovereignty to a central government. "Singly or in combinations reflecting the coincidence of interests, States seek to influence the pattern of power distribution and to determine their own places within that pattern." The expectations of order and peace come from the belief that competing powers will somehow balance and thereby neutralize one another to produce "deterrence through equilibration."] In contrast, under collective security, states share the long term goal of global peace, reversing relationship between individual and community goals mentioned in the balance of power theory, which fails to maintain stability. For example, it led to break down of war during the case of Napoleonic Wars and the World Wars, when states unilaterally decided to be unwilling or unable to fight.

At the same time, the concept of global government is about centralization. Global government is a centralized institutional system that possesses the power use of force like a well-established sovereign nation-state. The concept strips states of their "standing as centers of power and policy, where issues of war and peace are concerned" and superimposes on them "an institution possessed of the authority and capability to maintain, by unchallengeable force so far as may be necessary, the order and stability of a global community." Despite different characteristics of balance of power theory, collective security selectively incorporates both concepts, centralization and decentralization, which can broil down to the phrase "order without government." Thus, collective security seems to be more reliable alternative since it gathers power as a team to punish the aggressor, and it is an attempt to improve international relations and to provide solid rules under anarchy.

Collective Security and United Nation (UN)

Collective security within the international system currently functions within the UN, with principles of collective security contained in the UN Charter (Snyder, 1999). The UN system of collective security is dependent on the cooperation of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, namely the United States (US), Britain, France, Russia and China. During the Cold War, it was difficult to reach consensus on UN military interventions and, therefore, the UN military response to North Korea's invasion of South Korea in 1950, was an exception to the rule, since the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) at the time boycotted the UN Security Council in an attempt to have the permanent Chinese seat on the Council allocated to the communist Chinese government and not Taiwan. Another unique case was UN approval for up-scaling the UN mission in the Congo (1960-1964) from a peacekeeping mission to an intervention mission in 1961 (United Nations, 2001).

The permanent members of the UN Security Council, therefore, control the UN's collective security system and decisions on sanctions and interventions. This means that individual states cannot rely on this system for support when facing a crisis in terms of national defence. Yet national defence has, since the Cold War, rarely been the biggest concern for most states, since transnational and intrastate threats have become more incessant and immediate threats. The terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September 2001 (9/11), set in motion significant change in the interpretation and application of the concept of collective security, for pursuing more robust responses to international terrorism. In the 2004 'Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change', the use of military force for self-defence was considered justified, if a threat was 'imminent' to a country's national security (United Nations 2004).

High Panel Recommendation and Collective Security

The above-mentioned panel made several recommendations that became influential in terms of understanding and applying collective security within the UN context;

Firstly, that the international community has a collective 'responsibility to protect' (R2P) civilians in any state suffering gross human rights violations, even if their own government does not take responsibility to protect them, or is itself guilty of atrocities against them (United Nations, 2004). Military intervention to protect civilians is, even without the permission of the 'host-nation' government, considered a possible, though last resort. The UN Security Council Resolution 1973 on 17 March 2011 regarding the protection of Libyan civilians, is an application of this principle. The subsequent intervention and regime change in Libya by NATO, is an example of its abuse.

The second recommendation of the High-level Panel, was that regional security structures have to fill the void in the UN's limited peace operations capacity and conduct peace operations within their regions, with UN approval and accountability to the UN (United Nations, 2004).

Thirdly, that development is a foundation of collective security as part of an overarching effort to prevent conflict (United Nations 2004), which is indicative of the human security paradigm of the UN, which also informs its emphasis on post-conflict reconstruction and development.

Collective Security or Selective Interest

The 1945 United Nations Charter contains stronger provisions for decision-making and collective military action than those of the League of Nations Covenant, but it represents not a complete system of collective security but a balance between collective action and the

continued operation of the state's system, including the continued special roles of great powers. States in the UN collective security system are selective to support or oppose UN action in certain conflicts, based on their self-interests. The assumed prototype of collective security in modern times is the Gulf War. The war began in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait and ended in 1991 when a coalition of countries led by the United States expelled the Iraqi army from Kuwait and destroyed much of Iraq's military capability. The Gulf War was a war waged by coalition forces from 35 nations led by the United States against Iraq in response to Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait arising from oil pricing and production disputes.

Documented reports reveal that before 1961, Kuwait exited within Iraq territory but the British arbitrarily carved out the oil-rich region as an independent state of Kuwait. Iraq had argued that when Kuwait was granted independence in 1961by the British, that the act violated its territorial integrity and inviolability of its borders and Iraq declared its claim over the territory. If collective security can be used against Iraq in 1990 by UN upon Iraqi's claim on Kuwait, why is same collective security not used against United States when invaded Iraq in March, 2003 base on false claim that Iraq has weapon of mass destruction which was later revealed and proven to be blatant lies and conspiracy rather it was a plot to extort Iraqi's resources. What is the UN waiting for to apply the collective security against Russia since February, when the former started attacking Ukraine.

The UN can be somehow seen as the platform for "selective interest" purposes for members in Security Council because of the permanent members' veto power and the excessive assistance or aid, which have made those states to act unilaterally and to ignore the approval of or to violate resolutions of the Security Council. The Iraq Crisis is a clearer example: "Rather than seek the global interest of peace and security through stability in Iraq and the Middle East region, the domination-oriented members amassed their vast economic, diplomatic and military resources, captured and brazenly subjugated Iraq to an unprecedented condominial regime serving their economic interest under Iraq Reconstruction Programme" (Eke, 2007). What is the fate of Ukrainian? What will happen to Ukraine at the end of Russia – Ukraine war is unknown but predictable. In addition, the lack of geographical spread of members in the Security Council causes an imbalance in the role of maintenance global peace and security. The voices of small countries can be heard, but policies are not adopted in response to them unless they serve the great powers' interests.

Critiques of Collective Security

There are several points of critique regarding collective security:

Firstly, that the definition of collective security is too restrictive, since it focuses on formal, legally-binding commitments by states to act, when arrangements for security cooperation (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1995).

Secondly, that the League of Nations and the UN in theory do not serve as ideal examples of collective security, since neither facilitated binding commitments to stop aggression (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1995). Moreover, the establishment of an 'inner council' to determine collective action in both these organisations (that is, Council of the League of Nations and the UN Security Council), is viewed as serving the interests of only a few great powers, rather than the international system.

Thirdly, that within a large system of collective security with strong powers, many states may decide to 'free-ride' and not make significant contributions towards the collective security system. This could weaken the entire collective security system.

Fourthly, that the possibility of having to use war in order to prevent it, makes the solution equally as destructive as the problem (Rappard 1946). This could also make the implementation of collective security extremely expensive in terms of resources.

Finally, that collective security systems are generally unable to enforce their norms and, therefore, states have no guarantee that member states within the collective security system will actually come to their rescue, when being threatened or attacked. Collective security is not a fool-proof solution to preventing war, since various efforts to do so, have failed (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1995). Optimism for collective security seems to increase shortly after devastating wars, but tends to wane when interstate tensions and threats rise, and states subsequently want immediate, decisive action through military coercion. Collective security has not worked in practice, which points to a disjuncture between theory and practice on this concept, as well as its weakness compared to the concept of alliances (Booth 1987). Booth (1987) argues that "collective security in its pure theory is a dream" and that neutralism and non-alignment are unlikely to become longstanding international norms. In the next sections, the extent to which collective security was embraced and applied by the AU, will receive attention.

Conditions for Successful Collective Security

Collective security in the UN has not completely failed. The role of the UN and collective security in general is evolving with the rise of civil wars. Since the end of World War II, there have been several military conflicts worldwide, but only few of them have involved two or more states going to war with one another. The others have been civil wars in which other states have intervened in some manner. That means that collective security may have to evolve towards providing a means to ensure stability and a fair international resolution to those internal conflicts. Whether that involves more powerful peacekeeping forces or a larger role for the UN diplomatically is likely to be judged on a case-by-case basis. There are several conditions for collective security to be successful (McLean, 1996).

Firstly, states have to be content with the *status quo* including existing state boundaries and only use military force when defending other states or their own territory.

Secondly, states must have consensus on what aggression means and in which instances member states have to defend one or more states.

Thirdly, all member states and especially strong powers have to commit their armed forces and resources to stop aggression, or provide the necessary resources in time for another member state or states to do it. This must be done even for distant countries, where other states have little if any interests.

Lastly, all member states must refrain from and avert any contravention of sanctions that may aid aggressor states.

Summary

In the first part of the paper, collective security as a concept is explained with reference to how it differs from alliances and other related concepts, and how the meaning and application of the concept has changed within the international system. Theoretical aspects on the concept

collective security and the critique around the concept were discussed. The second part Identify and discuss the conflict situation where collective security was used. Critical evaluation of the situation where the so called “collective security” was said to have been used revealed that it was purely “selective interest” rather than collective security.

Conclusion/ Recommendations

The concept of collective security underwent significant changes in terms of scope since the inception of the League of Nations. Initially it focused mainly on keeping international peace by preventing interstate war between states through a legally binding agreement that if one state in a system is attacked, the others will come to its aid. More recently, collective security is applied on a regional level and mainly to serve the interest of the Super nations. The integrity and success of collective security are tested when it is conflicting with the interest of the stronger nations; the success of collective security depends on a number of strong powers that are willing and able to enforce the norms and rules of collective security. Collective security is a workable, yet imperfect and unreliable system for vulnerable countries and populations. The present structure of Security Council in United Nations and their veto power is a major threat and hindrance to collective security because members with veto power consider their national interest first before collective security. The Security Council should be restructured to accommodate equal members from all the continents and veto power should be abrogated while there should be “voting power” like that of general assembly.

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